Sofia Shirogorov biography

Yuri Belyut Military historian Sofia Shirogorov on the air of the Air program on the Khodorkovsky Live channel told Yuri Belyatu about why the Ukrainian counterattack is slowing down, about the examples of the partisan movement during the Second World War, about the stories of the breakthrough of defensive lines of the Mazhino and Mannerheim and the role of minefields in the modern war.

Despite the fact that the version of sabotage does not seem the most obvious, I want to talk to you about that very resistance and the enemy inside, that is, about the fifth column. This is how it was in the Second World War? We know a lot about the Belarusian partisans, about the rail wars, which were on the occupied units of the Soviet Union. And how was it in Europe, in France, in Belgium, in other countries, where there was also a German occupation?

In Yugoslavia, for example, partisans eventually essentially liberated their country from the troops of the axis countries, that is, the Red Army was not even very necessary here. In the same way, the partisans were very active in Poland and we know that in the year they even managed to “come to the surface”, as if about underground, they want to say, and arranged an uprising in Warsaw.

By the way, the Polish partisans also very actively exploded railways, prevented the German deliveries of goods to the Eastern Front. The Scandinavian, for example, Norwegian partisans are known for helping to bring allied aviation pilots into German plants who produced heavy water and were in the Nazi nuclear program. And the partisans, as it were, helped to cope with this.

So, if you look, in different countries during the Second World War, resistance played a role, performed its military tasks. Somewhere, as in Yugoslavia, more successfully, somewhere, as, for example, in France, less successfully. But this is such a rather significant part of the whole conflict. And, of course, we know about the Valkyrie operation in Germany and an attempt to attempt on Hitler, which failed.

But more about Germany and resistance inside Germany, almost nothing is known. Do we have any information about this? In addition to those who arranged an attempt on Hitler, and this was a group of resistance in the army, in the Wehrmacht, there were also groups of resistance among students, there were various kinds of Christian resistance groups, there were resistance groups in the opposition and political environment, among social democrats or communists.

Yes, public political life was completely destroyed and the leaders of these parties were sitting in the camps, but the lower asset remained. And some of these people went into such a deaf internal emigration, and some retained some activist ties and did a lot of things. And some leaflets at the factories were distributed, and tried to somehow spoil the military equipment.

There were people, for example, in the administrative apparatus of the Third Reich, who had various kinds of ties with the allies and also gave some information: for example, which plant produces. So, yes, the resistance inside Germany, perhaps, was not so numerous. We do not know, in fact, how it was by number, because someone died, someone never spoke about their role in resistance.

But, nevertheless, it was quite significant and quite significant. Just an attempt on Hitler is such a bright page, so everyone immediately remembers it. It has been going on for several months, many international media wrote that it almost choked and goes from the blitzkrieg regime to the positional slow promotion mode. If you recall the classic military doctrine, how did those very well -fortified defense lines hacks?

There was a Magino line, but Hitler somehow passed by her and nothing, but then Ukrainians can not cope with the fortifications, which are much less impressive. Let us honestly say: the Wagner line or the Surovikin line, as it is also called, can not be compared with a part of France dug by bunkers. Inspection of one of the bunkers of the Magino line in front of the Second World War.

Photo: The Russian State Archive of Film Photo -Documents is a good question that is now very worried about all military experts, and Western and not Western. Any defensive line is always a very large obstacle in any war. And we know examples of the First World War, and examples of World War II, and, by the way, not only. And in the Cold War there were conflicts, which also showed how difficult it is to storm well -fortified positions.

The problem is that when you begin to look for analogies, try to select them, you immediately see that these analogies work poorly. Indeed, there was a Magino line, the famous completely, this is a line along the French border, which was built in the interwar period. Almost immediately after the First World War, they began to build it, because the French generals were afraid that there would be some kind of repeated aggression from the German side.

And there was an idea that the line - this huge, completely fantastic, defensive - would either hold this aggression, or allow the French troops to sit in defense for a very long time.In general, it is clear that they built this line, based on the experience of the First World War. Because in the First World War defense, as it were, dominated the attack. We remember that the Western Front of the First World War did not move and did not move for years.

Well, they faded this line of Magino, but, as we recall, this did not help them very much. Because indeed, despite all its colossality, the Magino line was not impassable on every section. It just so happened that in some areas the French saved a little bit and this line made in some places weapons. This can also be understood, such a defensive line is very expensive. There, literally in those areas where everything was fine, where they did not save, for example, the underground railway tied the bastions among themselves and some fortified bunkers.

That is, you can imagine how much it cost in principle, how insanely it all is expensive. Well, in some places they saved and, in fact, saved in those places where, as the French generals suggested, it would be difficult to advance, for example, where the Arden forest, or where there are some kind of ravines, that is, a terrain that is unavailable for the offensive.

Well, it was in these places that German tanks passed and, in general, quite quickly this line broke through the Magino. There is such a stereotype, it is often pronounced by my colleagues too, they say that the Germans went around the Magino line. No, they did not bypass her, the Magino line was and existed in the place of the German breakthrough, they broke it out. But they broke it out in a weak area, it is more fair to say so.

Accordingly, we see that the defensive line did not help very much. Or, let's say, when there was a Soviet-Finnish war. In the year it began. By the way, it is often compared with her Russian-Ukrainian. Delo “millionaire” on the Mannerheim line. Photo: Wikicommons - and this is true. And it’s interesting how the Finns used [defense]. They really had a completely fantastic one another line of fortifications, the Mannerheim line.

And so they just used her to the fullest and squeezed everything they could from it. There, firstly, the terrain itself, this is the Soviet-Finnish border, is very difficult-there are forests, swamps, lakes, ravines. It is clear that any area is passable, but when you have such a crossed area, this creates a difficulty for the movement of troops, military equipment and, of course, tanks.

Accordingly, this defensive line was based on the complexity of the relief. Some areas, some flat area on which it was possible to approach, were mined and we remember that the Soviet army stormed this line Mannerheim for several months. And in fact, Mannerheim's line became a key obstacle to the Soviet blitzkrieg against Finland. Here, please, two defensive lines, both colossal resources and means are invested in both, but their role in the war, the same World War II, is completely different.

Mannerheim's line worked and defended, although, of course, in the end it was broken, any line can be broken out. And the Magino line was broken in just a few days. In general, as if no one expected such meanness from her. Western analysts are very fond of using them in communication with journalists and talk about minefields. Actually, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and Mr.

Zaluzhny, and President Zelensky, are saying about this, and the President of Zelensky rests on the fact that the quantity and concentration of these very minefields, which Russia left, retreating to its defensive lines, some incredible absolutely density and passing them is very difficult. We know that, in principle, as I understand it, the Wehrmacht also quite actively and successfully used minefields.

This is how their Soviet Union overcame in due time? When Western analysts looked at the APU's offensive at the very beginning of this offensive or when they only predicted possible results, they were all inside-they cannot be said “illusions”, let's say otherwise that a new war reigns in the 21st century. That is, now all these old methods - lines of trenches, minefields - this is not so important.

They themselves, apparently, since they fought a lot in the Middle East-and the war works so that your closest experience seems to you the most important and only working-they tried this experience, including, to our East European realities. The Russian army, having failed in the offensive, decided to defend myself in the old way, that is, still according to the Soviet doctrine.

And this Soviet doctrine of the second half of the 20th century, that is, the doctrine of the Cold War, suggested that there should be such a deeply echelonated defense. What is it? And this is when you have several lines of trenches, when you really have grandiose fields. The role of peaceful fields often, again, relying on the military messages, perceive so that minefields do not let tanks.

In fact, everything is a little different. The role of peaceful fields, mainly in directing the enemy. Slow down and direct.Because if we have a clean field, you can go with the speed that is convenient for you, you are the advancing side. But if your field is mined, you slow down. This is important. The second point: if the field is mined, you will choose some kind of safe road, cleanse it for yourself and you have freedom of maneuver becomes extremely limited.

You can move, your tanks, armored personnel carriers, and so on can only go along this safe strip. And now the Soviet doctrine rested on this. Because then? And then this opponent, who is slowly limited in freedom of maneuver and moves only along some specially purified safe road, it becomes vulnerable to artillery, for reactive fire systems. Say: for artillery, to make it clear, I do not want to rush in terms.

Accordingly, minefields never work on their own, minefields always work with artillery, with aviation, with anything else. Roughly speaking, minefields are simply delayed. And the Soviet doctrine was very simple to do this: that is, you really dig, like a mole, these lines of trenches, then you install these minefields, shoot, you have artillery and - please, even if the enemy gets out, then it falls into such a pocket.

And in this pocket it is destroyed from different sides, again, by artillery fire. And in fact, you even have no opportunity to retreat, because - but how?