Igor Zevelev Biography

These words of M. Gorbachev, describing the international situation at the end of G. However, the threats that the world faces today have a different orientation than the challenges that Gorbachev warned about. The leader of the superpower disappearing from the political map of the world, it would seem, not the most burning for his country at that moment the question: “We committed the Cold War.

How to make this result irreversible, prevent a return to confrontation? Today's Russia, which pursues an assertive foreign policy, is drawn into a new cold war. A high degree of uncertainty is the only thing that combines two turning points in world development. The lessons of our recent past can be extremely useful for understanding today's day. The key practical issue of today's agenda is how to get out of an extremely dangerous state of increasing confrontation between Russia and Western countries?

Gorbachev’s new book on international relations and foreign policy makes us think about a broader problem: is the world order possible in which strong Russia, which positions itself as a great power, is structurally and fruitfully cooperating with its Western partners? Or the price of the lack of Cold War and confrontation - the weakness and humility of Moscow? Most of the book is devoted to how Gorbachev and his associates, initiating dramatic changes in the world structure, persistently convinced their Western partners to join forces and derive the relations of the Soviet Union and the West from a state of cold war.

The first step was an honest assessment of the country's internal and international position, which faded both economically and intellectually: “Meanwhile, it seemed to be a relative well -being, stability, and order. The propaganda and misinformed society did not know how to do what was happening around and what awaits the country in the very near future. The slightest protests were suppressed.

And the majority considered them seducted, slander ... ”Nobel lecture,, p. Gorbachev made a historical choice, which since then has never regretted: restructuring and new foreign policy thinking. Francois Mitterand said on this occasion in Gorbachev in the summer of G. in the end, you could behave like your predecessors, and the result would be a disaster ”p. What moved Gorbachev: interests, values ​​or something else?

Theorists of international relations often refer to the great German sociologist Max Weber, who proposed the following metaphor: “Not ideas, but material and imaginary interests directly control the behavior of people. However, very often “pictures of the world”, formed by ideas, like switchmen, determined the path by which actions were sent, pushed by the dynamics of interests. ” This metaphor suggests that the paths have already been laid, it remains to choose one of them.

Modern Anglo-American sociologist Michael Mann developed the thought of Weber, adding that sometimes people, acting as railway layers, lay a new path along the virgin lands. This happens extremely rarely, but the foreign policy of Gorbachev can be described that way. Gorbachev says that the path that he paved was not one -way to the West, but by joint work on a decrease in the nuclear threat, the cessation of the Cold War and the construction of a more fair world order.

The USSR, according to Gorbachev, was called upon to be the leader of general efforts in these directions. Stubbornly and consistently, Gorbachev and his associates, among whom he especially distinguishes Alexander Yakovlev and Anatoly Chernyaev, was deeds about the real reduction of nuclear weapons, deideologization of international relations, the implementation of the ideas of the Helsinsky final act and the Paris Charter for New Europe.

With great respect, Gorbachev also recalls his Western partners, especially Reagan, Schulz, Thatcher, Kolya, Gensher and Mitteran, who did not immediately, but gradually adopted the new policy of Gorbachev. A little later, these joint efforts were interpreted as the creation of a new security arc from Vancouver to Vladivostok, taking into account the interests of all countries located in this arc.

The theoretician of international relations Robert Jervis claims that “it is often impossible to explain the adoption of key decisions and the development of a specific policy regardless of ideas about the world and images of other players that those who make decisions.” Gorbachev’s policy rested on ideas and worldview, which formed, although not always completely defined, his specific actions in the international arena.

The Gorbachev picture of the world is radically different from the great -powerful nationalism popular today. The foreign policy of Russia, especially after G. Today, many politicians, state and public figures in every possible way emphasize the continuity of centuries -old Russian history. Foreign policy, corresponding to the enduring status of a great power, has become the most important component of the construction of national identity.Ritual references to historical roots, unchanging and unchanging cultural features that go deep into the centuries attempts by the West to restrain and discard Russia have become part of Russian foreign policy rhetoric.

The Russian Empire and the Stalin-Brezhnev Soviet Union sometimes merge into a single great-power whole in this picture of the world. The Gorbachev period falls out of the official narrative, it violates the built -in slender scheme. The postulate of the continuity of the history of Russia as the most important element of the newly built national identity predetermined the emergence of the terms unusual for the foreign policy vocabulary in the lips of officials: “cultural and spiritual code of the nation”, “cultural matrix”.

These phrases should confirm the wisdom and foresight of a policy that has the origins "in our genes." There is nothing unique in this trend. Their today's leaders are guided by the pictures of the world, where each of these great countries proudly floats through the waves of history, without changing and not exposing external influences, which, of course, are always inquisitive.

This is the complete opposite of the worldview of Gorbachev. From the point of view of the theory of international relations, today the main contradiction is not between realism and liberalism, but between nationalism and universalism. In the ideological plan, Gorbachev challenged not only the party nomenclature and the yielding to the Soviet worldview, but also the philosophy of nationalism, conservatism, and partacularism.

How could the ideas of new thinking have a party functionary? The fact is that the picture of the world of Gorbachev and his associates was deeply rooted in the history of Russian social thought. It would be a delusion to consider Gorbachev’s policy an anomaly, who failed to offer an alternative to a conservative worldview, which has been exclusively on the heritage of Konstantin Leontiev, Nikolai Danilevsky and Ivan Ilyin, which are now often referred to.

In politically, Gorbachev paved the way along the virgin lands, while in the ideological way he relied on the deeply Russian tradition of universalism. Fedor Dostoevsky and Vladimir Soloviev, and in many ways the Bolsheviks, while they were still Marxists, wrote about "universalness." Dostoevsky defined the spirit of Russia as "its desire for the ultimate goals of his university and all -human." In his famous “Pushkin’s speech”, he said: “To become a real Russian, to become quite Russian, maybe, and then only in the end, this is emphasized to become a brother of all people, a bribe, if you want.” Gorbachev progressive universalism, based on universal values ​​and interests, was based on the complete exclusion of the use of force, both within the country and in international relations.

Today he adds that these ideas are "not only not outdated, but also got out of new relevance." Achilles fifth of such a picture of the world is the need to interact with partners who believe in military force, not excluding its application and guided idea of ​​maintaining their primacy and global leadership in the world stage. As soon as the Soviet Union, the US defense guide, has broken up, the Pentagon’s key secret document, which became known thanks to the leak, may have been intentional, so determined the main strategic task of the armed forces: “Our first goal is to prevent the emergence of a new opponent in the territory of the former Soviet Union or anywhere else ...

We must maintain so that potential opponents do not even strive for a larger regional regional or global role. " Gorbachev saw this problem extremely clearly. Speaking to the members of both chambers of the US Congress to G. From the standpoint of today, he adds: “Those who declared the Western victory in the Cold War, who refused to build a new, equal security system, bear a great share of responsibility for the current state of affairs, for the dangerous crisis of world policy” s.

Gorbachev’s bitterness says that “American politicians could not stand the test of history, were not at the height of their historical responsibility. Instead of a general victory over the Cold War, they decided to declare their “victory in the Cold War” with. Today, Trump's specific nationalism reflects a new picture of the world in the imagination of a part of American society, which calls into question the infinite global obligations of the United States, but the idea of ​​America’s championship does not go anywhere.

The question of the possibility of coexistence of a policy that denies power with the policy of other countries that do not deny it remains open. The dismantling of the Cold War tools began when the Soviet Union, although fading, was still relatively strong in military-political. Gorbachev shows how difficult and long the process of leaving the confrontation and cessation of the arms race with.

Already in the city of Gorbachev, he spoke about universal interests with. Most of the work was done beforeThus, the USSR was still quite strong under the leadership of Gorbachev searched for and found ways to get out of the dead end of the Cold War, not acting his interests. The beginning of the perestroika of the world order began when Ronald Reagan was the main partner of Gorbachev in negotiations.

This was a unique circumstance: a coincidence by the time in power in the two superpowers of the reformer Gorbachev and ultra -conservator Reagan. Oddly enough, this is what made it possible to solve many issues. Gorbachev recalls how he asked George Schulz: there would be a grand shift in bilateral relations and, in particular, in the field of disarmament, if the president had not been Reagan.

Thinking, Schulz replied: “Perhaps not. The distrust of the USSR was overcome thanks to your steps, but also due to the fact that such a conservative politician as Ronald Reagan went towards you. He had no rivals on this field. If it weren’t for him, an agreement on the liquidation of medium -range missiles could not ratify in the Senate ”p. Reagan could afford to start a serious joint work with Moscow, without fear of accusations of surrendering US national interests.

On the basis of Gorbachev, the description and analysis of the way out of the Cold War can draw several conclusions regarding the possibility of terminating the current confrontation in relations between Russia and the West. Obviously, these conclusions can be relevant only for the next generation of leaders. Firstly, the depolitization and deideologization of international relations is needed.

It is necessary to draw a line between domestic and foreign policy, between the construction of national identity and relations with specific states. The thesis of the United States unilateral victory in the Cold War was established during the election struggle at the end - the first half of G. this, however, did not help him. A mixture of historical narratives and foreign policy tasks in Russia, as in many neighboring countries, is also absolutely counterproductive.

Secondly, it is necessary to leave illusions about the possibility of solving accumulated issues in relations from the perspective of power. Back in the city, Gorbachev prosperly argued: “It will not be possible to hold Russia in the offsade of world politics. Such attempts in the future are hopeless, and their only result will be to harm Russian democracy, if not its complete undermining ”p.

Today, Gorbachev advises Western leaders: “It is impossible to“ punish ”Russia or isolate Russia. It’s time to abandon such attempts ”s. Gorbachev spoke about this in Bush in the city today, taking into account the growth of global instability, the rise of Asia and colossal changes in the world balance of forces, Russia is all the more disadvantageous.

In order to get out of confrontation, each of the partners should feel confident both within the country and in the military-political situation in the international arena. It was these circumstances, despite the growing internal problems in the Soviet Union, which was generally present in years. The weakness of one of the parties leads to the temptation of a partner to achieve a unilateral victory or at least announce it, as happened in years.

With the consequences of this, we still live. The Soviet Union under Gorbachev, despite the growing problems within the country, especially in the last two years of its existence, had a tremendous “soft force”, achieving the desired results of the end of the Cold War and changing the behavior of other states.